Risk Management Requirements – 510k vs DHF

1 Comment / 510(k), Design Control, ISO 14971:2019 (Risk Management) / By Robert Packard

What are the differences between 510k risk management requirements and risk management requirements for your Design History File (DHF)?

Risk management requirements integration with design

Last week I presented a free webinar on how to combine risk management with design controls when planning to submit a 510k. Many questions were asking what the design control and risk management requirements are for a 510k.

What are the 510k design control requirements?

There is no specific part of the regulations stating what the 510k design control requirements are. However, some aspects of the DHF are required as 510k design control documentation, but not necessarily in the exact form as maintained in the DHF. For example, Design Inputs and Design Outputs are presented as applicable recognized standards and design specifications, while others will remain precisely the same (i.e., verification and validation test reports).

What are the Risk Management Requirements in a 510k?

For 510k submissions, the only risk management requirements are the inclusion of risk documentation for devices containing software of at least moderate level risk. There are some exceptions to this as well, though, based on a few special control guidance documents—especially when the submission type is an abbreviated 510k. This is article identifies which of the DHF and RMF elements are 510k design control requirements and 510k risk management requirements.

Quality system requirements for design controls

Design Controls are identified in 21 CFR 820.30. Every manufacturer of any Class II or Class III devices and certain Class I devices (Class I devices with software, tracheobronchial suction catheters, surgeon gloves, protective restraints, radionuclide applicators, radionuclide teletherapy devices) need to control design per this regulation. The requirement for a Design History File is item j) and states:

“Each manufacturer shall establish and maintain a DHF for each type of device. The DHF shall contain or reference the records necessary to demonstrate that the design was developed following the approved design plan and the requirements of this part.”

The “requirements of this part” refer to the other bullets in 21 CFR 820.30 which can be summarized as:

a) Establish and maintain procedures to control the design of a device.

b) Design and Development Planning – Each manufacturer shall establish a plan that describes the design and development activities and defines responsibilities for implementation.

c) Design Inputs – Manufacturers need to ensure design requirements relating to a device are appropriate and address the intended use of the device.

d) Design Outputs – Design outputs need to be documented in terms that allow an adequate evaluation of conformance to design input requirements. Design outputs that are essential for the proper functioning of the device should be identified.

e) Design Review – Formal documented reviews of design results should be planned and conducted at appropriate stages of device development.

f) Design Verification – Design verification confirms that the design output meets the design input requirements.

g) Design Validation – Design validation shall be performed under defined operating conditions on initial production units or their equivalents. It shall ensure that devices conform to defined user needs and meet the intended use of the device.

h) Design Transfer – Design transfer documentation shall ensure that the device design is correctly translated into production specifications.

i) Design Changes – changes should be identified, documented, validated/verified, reviewed, and approved before their implementation.

The Design History File is intended to be a repository of the records required to demonstrate compliance with your design plan and design control procedures. While companies are required to create and maintain this documentation according to the FDA regulation, not all of the documentation will be reviewed as part of the 510k. The following table compares the elements that comprise a DHF with the 510k design control requirements.

DHF Element	510k Design Control Requirements
Design Plan	Not Required

User Needs & Design Inputs	Declaration of Conformity User needs are design requirements that require design validation (e.g., adequacy of user training, and safety/performance of the device for the indications for use). Some design inputs will appear in the form of standards in the FDA eSTAR template. If you are declaring conformity with these standards, a Declaration of Conformity is automatically created in the FDA eSTAR template.
Design Outputs	Device Description (Section 11) The Device Description lists the specifications of the device, and your Design Outputs document will help populate the Device Description. This can include drawings, pictures, or written specifications that describe your device.
Labeling	Proposed Labeling (Section 13) The labeling is usually considered part of the Design Outputs within the DHF and is included specifically in the labeling section of the 510(k) submission. This includes both the Instructions for Use and any Package Labeling.
Verification and Validation Protocols	Not Required You do not have to include the protocols, but the reviewer may ask to see them if they have any questions when reviewing the reports.
Verification and Validation Reports	Sterilization (Section 14) Biocompatibility (Section 15) Software (Section 16) Electrical Safety and EMC (Section 17) Bench Performance Testing (Section 18) Animal Performance Testing (Section 19) Clinical Performance Testing (Section 20) Of course, not all of these sections will be applicable to every device. Still, you should include all relevant validation test reports within your submission in the appropriate part of the 510k. Typically, each of these sections will have a cover sheet that outlines the reports that are included within the section, and then you can just include the report from the DHF in its entirety behind the cover sheet in that section.
Process Validation	Only required for sterilization validation typically, but there are exceptions for novel materials and coatings
Work Instructions	Not Required for 510k
Design Review Meeting Minutes	Not Required for 510k
Design Trace Matrix	Only required for software
Risk Management File	Sometimes – See Risk Management File Table Below
Post-Market Surveillance Plan	Not Required, but a few exceptions for high-risk devices
Clinical Data Summary	Required only if used to demonstrate safety and efficacy
Regulatory Approval	It Will result from 510k Clearance, so nothing is to be included in the 510k submission.

510k Risk Management Requirements

Regarding the FDA regulations for risk management, there is a requirement under the Design Validation section of 21 CFR 820.30 that states:

“Design validation shall include software validation and risk analysis, where appropriate.”

For FDA compliance and CE Marking, both recognize ISO 14971 as the standard for risk management. FDA recognizes ISO 14971:2007 whereas EN ISO 14971:2012 is the European National version for CE Marking. Rob Packard wrote an article describing the contents of the risk management file as well as the specific differences in the requirements between the FDA and CE Marking with regard to ISO 14971.

For your 510k submission, the FDA only requires risk management documentation to be included if the product contains software, and the risk is at least a level of “moderate concern”. There are some other cases when risk management is required by special controls guidance documents, but even when it is required, you only have to submit your risk analysis. The table below describes the risk management requirements in greater detail.

RMF Element	510k Risk Management Requirement
Risk Management Plan	Not Required
Hazard Identification	510ks with Software Only (Section 16) Hazard Identification is only required for devices that have a software component. It is not required for most other devices.
Risk Assessment	510(k)s with Software (Section 16) Certain Special Controls Guidance The Risk Assessment is only required to be included in your device contains software, or if a special controls guidance document specifically requires a risk assessment. It is not required for other 510ks.
Risk Control Option Analysis	Software and Certain Special Controls Guidance
Risk Control Verification and Validation	Sterilization (Section 14) Biocompatibility (Section 15) Software (Section 16) Electrical Safety and EMC (Section 17) Bench Performance Testing (Section 18) Animal Performance Testing (Section 19) Clinical Performance Testing (Section 20) This will not be any additional or special documentation specific to Risk Management and was already included in the DHF breakdown above. Still, the verification and validation also relate to risk management in ensuring that the risks have been adequately mitigated.
Risk-Benefit Analysis	Not Required for 510(k) Risk-Benefit analyses are only required for De Novo applications, Humanitarian Device Exemptions, and PMAs.
Informing Users and Patients of the Risks	Labeling (Section 13) Part of the risk management will appear in the Labeling section of the 510k as warnings, contraindications, and precautions within the Instructions for Use and Package Labeling.
Risk Management Report	Not Required

Special Controls Guidance Documents with Risk Management Requirements

Your first step in preparing your 510k submission is to search the FDA Guidance Document Database to determine if there is an applicable guidance document for your device. You can read another blog we wrote to explain Special Controls Guidance documents, and how to determine if one applies to your device. The following list provides examples of Class II Special Controls Guidance documents that require risk analysis to be included within the 510k:

When there are 510k risk management requirements, the special controls guidance document will typically state, “We recommend that the summary report contain:

An identification of the Risk Analysis method(s) used to assess the risk profile in general as well as the specific device’s design and the results of this analysis. (Refer to Section 6 for the risks to health generally associated with the use of this device that the FDA has identified.)

Discussion of the device characteristics that address the risks identified in this class II special controls guidance document, as well as any additional risks identified in your risk analysis.”

The special controls guidance will also identify risks to health that have been identified for products of that type, which you should be sure to include in your risk analysis as appropriate.

More Information on Design Control and Risk Management Requirements

Hopefully, you are now able to determine which elements of your DHF are 510k design control requirements and which elements of your RMF are 510k risk management requirements. If you would like more information about how to implement design controls and risk management within your product development process, please consider registering for one of our training webinars:

If you need any further information or specific assistance with your 510k submission, please feel free to send me an email at mary@fdaecopy.com or schedule a call with our principal consultant, Rob Packard. He can answer any of your medical device regulatory questions.

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Feb 1 2017

Checking adverse event history for your device and competitors

1 Comment / ISO 14971:2019 (Risk Management) / By Robert Packard

The article explains checking adverse event data for medical devices as part of design and development, risk management, and post-market surveillance.

When should you be checking adverse event history?

There are three times when you should be checking adverse event history:

when you are planning a new or improved medical device, and you want to know how current devices on the market malfunction (design and development planning),
when you are identifying hazards associated with a medical device as part of your risk management process, and
when you are gathering post-market surveillance data about your device and competitor devices.

Where should you be checking adverse event history?

Most countries have some kind of database for gathering adverse event data for medical devices, but most of these databases are not open to the public. The most common question I am asked is, “How do you access the Eudamed database?” for reporting of adverse events in Europe. Unfortunately, you can’t access Eudamed. The Eudamed database is only available to competent authorities at this time. The primary publicly accessible database for adverse event reporting is the US FDA MAUDE database. The MAUDE database is also integrated with other FDA databases for 510k submissions and recalls. This combined database is called the Total Product Life Cycle database.

Are there other public databases for checking adverse event history?

Yes. The Therapeutic Good Administration (TGA) in Australia makes adverse event data publicly available. The TGA also has a national registry for implanted orthopedic devices that publishes an annual report. Other countries also have public registries.

When will checking adverse event data for Europe be possible?

The Eudamed database for Europe was created in 1999 by the German organization DIMDI. In 2000 the responsibility for the database was taken over by the European Commission. The latest update is that manufacturers will be responsible for updating the Eudamed database in the future as part of the new European Regulations. This requirement will be implemented during the next years. The database will also become accessible to the public.

When you collect post-market surveillance data, which data should you collect?

Searching for post-market surveillance data should be performed on a risk-based frequency. If you have a brand new device, a high-risk device, or a device that is implanted, post-market surveillance data should be reviewed frequently–either monthly or quarterly. The new European guidance document for clinical evaluation reports (MEDDEV 2.7/1 rev 4) requires that clinical evaluation reports be updated at least annually for these devices. It is also important that you collect post-market surveillance data for both your device and competitor products. Therefore, you should be reviewing all the publicly available adverse event databases. You should also be reviewing your complaint data, and you should be searching for journal articles that may include adverse event data–possibly associated with a clinical study.

Available Resources

If you want to learn more about post-market surveillance data collection, please visit our webinar page. There is also a procedure for Post-Market Surveillance (SYS-019).

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Nov 6 2015

Risk Management Traceability for CE Marking Technical Files

2 Comments / ISO 14971:2019 (Risk Management) / By Robert Packard

How to use risk management traceability for CE Marking to cross-reference hazards, risks, and risk controls throughout your technical file.

This approach will more efficiently integrate risk management tools into your Design History File (DHF), post-market surveillance documentation, and clinical evaluation reports (CERs). The table above provides a simple template for the nomenclature of risk management elements that you need to cross-reference and provides risk management traceability throughout your technical documentation.

The table does not include a cross-reference code for verification and validation reports because there could and typically are multiple risk controls that are validated and verified for each risk. Many times they are applied across multiple product lines. Therefore, it is more efficient to simply reference the controlled document number for the verification report that is applicable to that risk control.

The basic concept of traceability

The concept of risk traceability is more than being able to identify the verification and validation study that was performed to verify the effectiveness of risk controls in your FMEA because it is in the same row of your table. The best practice is to number your hazards, risks, and risk controls so that you can cross-reference more easily throughout all your technical documentation [i.e., design requirements matrix, risk management file, clinical evaluation report, post-market surveillance plan/reports, and post-market clinical follow-up (PMCF) report].

Design Requirements Traceability Matrix (DRTM)

The design requirements traceability matrix (DRTM) is a combination of two documents that have been used for the past two decades by medical device manufacturers: 1) the design requirements matrix or IOVV (i.e., inputs, outputs, verification, and validation), and 2) the risk traceability matrix. The second document is less commonly used, but an example of one is provided in Figure 3 of the GHTF risk management guidance document SG3 N15R8.

The risk management summary table that is presented in Figure 3 of the guidance also provides cross-references to specific tests, and each test has an identification number for traceability. This approach is also used frequently in risk control plans–an excellent tool for production process controls and planning product realization before process validation.

Risk management traceability to post-market surveillance

I recommend that companies create a post-market surveillance plan for devices or device families during the design transfer process. This is NOT the post-market surveillance procedure. Your procedure should indicate the process you use for post-market surveillance. Still, your plan should be process-specific and identify specific risks that you intend to gather post-production data for. The post-market surveillance plan should provide traceability back to each risk in your risk management file (e.g., R1, R2, R3). You should include a post-market clinical follow-up (PMCF) protocol and report that also cross-reference to these risks and associated risk controls–or provide a justification for not conducting a PMCF study. In 2016, the new European Medical Device Regulations (EMDR) will require that both the protocol and the report be included in your post-market surveillance plan as a required section (see Annex II of the proposed regulations) of the technical file or design dossier. Finally, I recommend that you revise and update your risk management plan for post-production data collection at the time of design transfer. When you make this revision, I recommend moving the risk management plan from the design plan to your post-market surveillance plan as an integral part of the plan (i.e., one of the primary sections of the plan).

Risk Management Traceability for Your Clinical Evaluation Report (CER)

In your clinical evaluation report (CER), if you simply said that “the clinical data reviewed addresses all of the residual risks identified in the risk management summary report,” you are not specific enough. Your clinical evaluation report (CER) should explain how the clinical study data you reviewed addresses each of the risks that you identified in your risk analysis. Personally, I like to have subsections in the discussion section of the clinical evaluation report (CER) for each of the risks identified in the risk management file. I also do this when I write my post-market surveillance plan. When I do this, I include a cross-reference to the applicable hazard in my design requirements matrix, risk analysis, and hazard identification summary report (e.g., “HZ1”, “HZ1” and “HZ3”).

Traceability to warnings & precautions

Disclosing residual risks to users of your device is required in the EU MDR and it is a risk control. However, you cannot claim to reduce the risks of your product by disclosing these residual risks because warnings and precautions are not effective. You should still validate the effectiveness of the instructions for use, technique guide, and training through simulated use studies before product release. Do not claim a quantitative risk reduction in your risk analysis. Of course, there can be a reduction in overall risks when you train users, but you can’t claim it, and the prevalence of use errors demonstrates the limited effectiveness of IFUs and training.

Additional risk management references

Please click here if you are looking for risk management training. There are a number of additional risk management articles on our website that were created in preparation for an international conference in Brussels.

Procedures & templates for risk management

If you are looking for a risk management procedure (SOP), SYS-010 meets the requirements of ISO 14971:2019 and Regulation (EU) 2017/745 for CE Marking.

Risk Management Traceability for CE Marking Technical Files Read More »

Oct 19 2015

Risk Management File Compliance for 510k and CE Marking

4 Comments / ISO 14971:2019 (Risk Management) / By Robert Packard

This article compares risk management file FDA requirements for CE Marking and 510k submission requirements.

The FDA only requires documentation of risk management in a 510k submission if the product contains software, and the risk is at least a “moderate concern.” Even then, the 510k only requires the submission of a design risk analysis rather than your complete risk management file. Knee implants do not require submission of risk analysis, even though manufacturers are required to perform risk analysis in accordance with ISO 14971, because knee implants do not contain software. Therefore, it is not uncommon for a product that is already 510k cleared to receive audit nonconformities related to the risk management documentation during a technical file review by a Notified Body.

The FDA recognizes ISO 14971:2007 as the standard for risk management of medical devices. CE Marking also requires compliance with ISO 14971, but specifically the European national version of the standard (i.e., EN ISO 14971:2012). The most common technical file deficiencies related to risk management during a CE Marking application include the following:

compliance with ISO 14971:2007 instead of EN ISO 14971:2012
reduction of risks as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) instead of reducing risks as far as possible (AFAP)
reducing risks by notifying users and patients of residual risks in the IFU
only addressing unacceptable risks with risk controls instead of all risks–including negligible risks

Each of these deficiencies is also explained in Annex ZA, ZB, and ZC of EN ISO 14971:2012.

7 Deviations you must address in your risk management file

Notified Body auditors are supposed to be reviewing your risk management process and sampling your risk management file(s) to verify that you conform with the requirements for a risk management file as defined in EN ISO 14971:2012 and the applicable European directive. Most manufacturers with CE Certificates have updated their procedures for compliance with the European National version, but the updates are not always complete or done correctly. Therefore, auditors need to be systematic in their review for compliance. I recommend creating a three-column table in your audit notes for each of the seven deviations. The first column would state the requirement from the applicable annex of EN ISO 14971:2012. The second column is used to document wherein the risk management procedure, and each of the seven requirements is addressed. Suppose you can’t find it quickly during your review–as the person you are auditing to find it for you. The third column is used to document which risk management file you sampled, and wherein the risk management file, the auditor was able to find compliance with one of the deviations. Risk management training of the cross-functional risk management team should also be sampled by the auditor. If the auditor can’t find an example of compliance in the procedure or the risk management file, then there is a minor nonconformity that needs to be corrected and recurrence needs to be prevented.

Note: Remember that auditing is about verifying compliance–not scouring 100% of the records for nonconformity.

Procedure review

The first step in responding to correcting deficiencies in your risk management process is to update your procedure. The following basic elements need to be included in the procedure:

risk management plan
hazard identification
risk analysis
risk control option analysis
verification of risk control effectiveness
risk/benefit analysis
risk management report

Many of the procedures I review focus on the risk analysis process, and the most common tool for risk analysis is a failure mode and effects analysis. This is an excellent tool for process risk analysis, but it is only one of many possible tools, and it is not ideally suited for design risk analysis. In addition, your procedure is not adequate as a risk management plan. You need risk management plans that are product-specific or specific to a product family. Your risk management plan must also change and adapt as products progress from the design and development process to post-market surveillance. Finally, many of the procedures only require a benefit/risk analysis to be performed when risks are not acceptable, while the European MDD requires that all CE Marked products include a benefit/risk analysis for each risk identified in the risk analysis and the overall risk of the product or product family.

Risk management plans

Risk management is required throughout product realization, but the activities are quite different during the pre-market and post-market phases. Therefore, I recommend including a risk management plan as part of the design and development plan to address pre-market needs for risk management. Once a product development project reaches the design transfer phase, then a post-market risk management plan needs to be written. I incorporate this plan into the post-market surveillance plan for the product or product family. This approach ensures that the risk analysis will be linked directly with post-market surveillance after the product is released.

Hazard identification

Many companies do create a specific document that identifies all the hazards associated with a product. This is an important step that should occur early in the design and development process before design inputs are finalized. During the development process, these hazards may need to be updated as materials and production processes are developed. Some companies may choose to identify hazards at a different time or in a different way. Still, the proposed European Medical Device Regulations (EMDR) require that the dangers are recognized as one of the essential requirements. The ISO 14971:2007 standard suggests that design teams should identify as many hazards as possible, estimate the risks, and then implement risk controls for any unacceptable risks. The EN ISO 14971:2012 standard requires that risk controls be implemented for hazards–regardless of acceptability. For this reason, I recommend companies restrict their identification of hazards to the most likely product malfunctions and hazards of high severity. This list should include any hazards already identified in the FDA’s MAUDE database.

Benefit/risk analysis & risk traceability matrix

To perform a benefit/risk analysis, you have to know the likelihood of potential hazards resulting in harm and the clinical benefits of a product. Unfortunately, reduced costs cannot be used to justify the acceptability of a device. Benefit/risk analysis must be performed for each risk and the overall residual risks. Therefore, it is important to identify the clinical benefits that outweigh each of the risks. I recommend using a risk traceability matrix in order to document each benefit/risk analysis. This can be a separate risk management document, or it can be incorporated into a design requirements matrix. It is also important to identify any warnings, precautions, or contraindications that should be documented in the information provided to patients and users when risks cannot be eliminated. This may be the last column of your risk traceability matrix.

Risk management report

The risk management report should be a summary technical document (i.e., STED). The STED should reference the procedure that was used and indicate all the risk management activities that were performed specifically to the product or product family defined in the scope of the risk management report. The dates of activities, changes made, and cross-references to any controlled documents should be included in the risk management report. I recommend maintaining the risk management report as a controlled document and revising the document to reference additional risk management activities when they occur. The bulk of details should be contained in the referenced risk management documents within the report.

Procedures and templates for your risk management file

We also have a procedure (SOP) for risk management (SYS-010).

Risk Management File Compliance for 510k and CE Marking Read More »

Feb 26 2014

Labeling risk controls – Deviation #7 in EN ISO 14971:2012

3 Comments / ISO 14971:2019 (Risk Management) / By Robert Packard / EN ISO 14971:2012, risk management for medical devices, Risk Management-Deviation 7 in EN ISO 14971:2012

Requirements for the Instructions for Use and labeling as labeling risk controls for medical devices in ISO 14971.

This article reviews the requirements for Instructions for Use and labeling as risk controls in the risk management standard for medical devices: ISO 14971. Specifically, the impact of the seventh deviation identified in the EN ISO 14971 Standard is reviewed. This is the 7^th and final blog in our EN ISO 14971:2012 risk management series. If you would like additional, risk management training, we have a training webinar.

Why are labeling risk controls not effective?

Labeling, instructions, and warnings are required for medical devices. Unfortunately, the information provided by manufacturers is not effective at preventing hazardous situations and foreseeable misuse–especially if the user throws the paper leaflet in the garbage 10 seconds after the box is opened. Since the information provided to the user and patients is not effective in preventing harm, the European Commission indicated that this information (i.e. labeling risk controls) should not be attributed to risk reduction.

Labeling risk controls do not quantitatively reduce risks

The European Commission is not suggesting that your company should stop providing directions or warning users of residual risks. This deviation intends to identify incorrect risk estimation procedures. For example, if you are using Failure Mode And Effects Analysis (FMEA), (see Annex G.4 of the risk management standard) to estimate risk for a new product, you should not be listing labeling risk controls as the primary risk control. Clause 6.2 of the ISO 14971 Standard correctly identifies “information for safety” provided by the manufacturer as risk controls. Still, the effectiveness of labeling risk controls is so poor that you should not estimate that the implementation of labeling and IFUs reduces risks.

In Clause 2.15 of the ISO 14971 Standard, residual risk is defined as “risk remaining after risk control measures have been taken.” However, I prefer the following definition, which incorporates the concept of clinical evidence, design validation, and post-market surveillance:

“Residual risks are risks that remain: 1) after implementation of risk controls, 2) when products are used for new indications for use, 3) when products are used for wider user and patient populations, 4) when products are misused, and 5) when products are used for periods of time longer than the duration of pre-market clinical studies.”

The second essential requirement (ER2) states that users shall be informed of residual risks, but the conclusion that “information about residual risks cannot be a risk control” is incorrect. The most important wording in the deviation is “the information given to the users does not reduce the (residual) risk any further.” Failure to reduce risks any further is due to the lack of effectiveness of risk controls. Validation of risk control effectiveness should be performed during design validation, but validation will be limited to a small group of users and patients.

Risk management reports & post-market surveillance planning

In your risk management report, risk control options analysis should be summarized. Instead of evaluating risk acceptability before implementing risk controls, risk controls should be implemented, and any residual risks should be identified. A benefit/risk analysis must be performed for each residual risk and the overall residual risks. If the conclusion is that the benefits of the device outweigh the residual risks, then the device can be commercially released.

At the time of the final design review and commercial release, a Post-Market Surveillance (PMS) plan should be developed that includes an updated risk management plan. The updated risk management plan should specifically address how to estimate residual risks and verify the effectiveness of information provided to users and patients. Verification of risk control effectiveness should be part of the design verification and validation activities, but verification of effectiveness should also be part of ongoing PMS.

To facilitate future updates of your risk management report, you may want to organize risk controls into the following categories (in this order):

Design elements (highly effective)
Materials of construction (highly effective)
Methods of manufacture (highly/moderately effective)
Protective measures & alarms (moderately effective)
Information provided to users & patients (least effective)

Each of the above risk controls will need to be addressed by your PMS plan.

Labeling risk controls – Deviation #7 in EN ISO 14971:2012 Read More »

Dec 3 2013

Risk Control Options for Medical Devices: Deviation #6

1 Comment / ISO 14971:2019 (Risk Management) / By Robert Packard / risk analysis for medical devices, risk control options for medical devices, risk management

This blog discusses risk control options for medical devices; the 6th deviation identified in the European National version of the Risk Management Standard.

Design is not the same as design and construction. This is the interpretation of the European Commission. The sixth of the seven deviations identified in the European National (EN) version of the Risk Management Standard (i.e., EN ISO 14971:2012; http://bit.ly/ISO14971-2012changes), states that “inherent safety by design” is not precise enough. Section 2 of the Essential Requirements (i.e., Annex I of the MDD) states that the first risk control option must be selection of design and construction that eliminates or reduces risk as far as possible, while the international (ISO) risk management standard (i.e., ISO 14971:2007) only states that inherent safety by design is required.

The difference between the requirements of the ISO and the EN standard are not just semantics. If you read part II of the Essential Requirements (ERs; i.e., ER 7-13), there are many examples of how the construction of devices should be considered. The following are three examples:

ER 7.5 – leaking from the device
ER 8.2 – tissues of animal origin
ER 9.2 -aging of materials

Therefore, in order to comply the the intent of the Directive, you must consider far more than just the design of the device. Construction is interpreted as both the risks associated with the materials to fabricate a device and the methods of manufacture. In the proposed EU regulations, the European Commission seeks to clarify the requirements for implementation of risk controls, but the draft legislation still seems vague.

Implementing Risk Control Options for Medical Devices

The following wording for implementation of risk control options in the new proposed second Essential Requirement is below:

“The manufacturer shall apply the following principles in the priority order listed:

a. identify known or foreseeable hazards and estimate the associated risks arising from the intended use and foreseeable misuse;

b. eliminate risks as far as possible through inherently safe design and manufacture

c. reduce as far as possible the remaining risks by taking adequate protection measures, including alarms; and

d. provide training to users and/or inform users of any residual risks.”

In this proposed wording, the word “construction” was replaced by the word “manufacture.” However, in other parts of the new proposed Essential Requirements (http://bit.ly/NewERCGap) the materials of fabrication are specifically addressed, as well. For example:

ER 7.1d) was added as a new requirement…”d) the choice of materials used, reflecting, where appropriate, matters such as hardness, wear and fatigue strength.”
ER 7.6 was added as a new requirement to address risks associated with the size and properties of particles—especially nanomaterials.

The new proposed Essential Requirements also include numerous examples of how the manufacturing processes must ensure proper safety. Essential Requirement 10 specifically references new Commission Regulation (EU) No 722/2012 (http://bit.ly/AnimalTissueReg)–specific to devices manufactured using animal tissues or cells of animal origin.

Even though the proposed regulations are more detailed with regard to application of risk management, they do not specify if it is required to implement risk control options for both materials and methods of manufacture simultaneously, or if the manufacturer may choose between the two. The phrase “taking account of the generally acknowledged state of the art” is used in the second Essential Requirement, but “state of the art” is a moving target, and the European Commission may find existing Standards to be deficient.

For reducing the risk of infection, the Commission does not require that companies implement aseptic processing, antimicrobial materials and terminal sterilization. One of the three is sufficient. This is why we have ISO Standards for sterilization validation, and we define “sterile” as a sterility assurance level of 10-6.

If the Commission maintained the language of the ISO 14971:2007 Standard, “as low as reasonably practicable,” then manufacturers could select risk control options based upon acceptability of risk. However, the EN version of the risk management standard creates significant challenges for implementation, and we are forced to evaluate the risk control measures we implement against those used by other manufacturers during the process of risk option analysis.

If you are interested in ISO 14971 training, we are conducting a risk management training webinar on October 19, 2018.

Risk Control Options for Medical Devices: Deviation #6 Read More »

Oct 9 2013

Risk Control Selection – Deviation #5 in ISO 14971

2 Comments / ISO 14971:2019 (Risk Management) / By Robert Packard / CE marking, ISO 14971, ISO 14971 deviation #5, medical devices, risk control

ISO 14971:2012 deviation #5 is specific to selecting risk control options and protective measures for CE Marking medical devices.

If your company is CE Marking medical devices, you are required to satisfy the Essential Requirements for Safety and Performance as defined in the three European Directives: the MDD, the AIMD, and the IVDD. Throughout these Essential Requirements, there is a requirement to reduce risks “as far as possible” (AFAP) by implementing risk controls. At one time, the expectation was for companies to implement state of the art concerning risk controls, and “state of the art” was interpreted as the latest version of the harmonized ISO Standards. However, lawyers dominating the European Commission appear to disagree with the status quo.

Therefore, in 2012, the European National (EN) version of the Medical Device Risk Management Standard was revised. There is no change to the content of Clauses 1 through 9. Instead, the European Commission identified seven content deviations between the ISO 14971 Standard and the EU Directives. These deviations are identified and explained in Annexes ZA, ZB, and ZC. This blog is the fifth installment of Medical Device Academy’s seven-part blog series on this topic. The goal of the series is to identify solutions for meeting the Essential Requirements by suggesting changes to the current best practices of implementing a risk management process for medical device design.

Discretion as to the Risk Control Options/Measures

Essential Requirements 1 and 2 require that risk control options are implemented for all risks before determining the acceptability of residual risks. The 2nd Essential requirement also requires manufacturers to implement all risk control options—unless the risk controls do not further reduce risk.

Clause 6.2 of the 14971 Standard suggests that you only need to use “one or more” of the risk control options, and Clause 6.4 indicates that further risk control measures are not required if the risk is acceptable. There is an apparent contradiction between the intent of the Standard and the Directives.

If risk acceptability has no impact on whether you will implement risk controls, there is no need for performing a preliminary risk evaluation. Therefore, I have three recommendations for changes to your current risk management process:

Ignore Clause 5 of the 2007/2009 version of ISO 14971
Eliminate the second step of risk assessment from your flow chart for risk management (see Figure 1 from the 14971 Standard)
Define risk management policies upon clinical benefits, rather than absolute risks

Instead of performing a preliminary risk evaluation (Clause 6.5), risk/benefit analysis should be moved to Clause 7, where the evaluation of overall residual risk acceptability is required. By making this change, risk controls will be implemented, regardless of risk acceptability, and the acceptability of risks will be dependent upon the risk/benefit analysis alone.

Impact of this Deviation

Implementing changes to your risk management process to address this deviation has great potential to impact the design of devices—not just the risk management documentation. Design teams will no longer be able to stop the design process with an initial design that has an “acceptable risk.” Instead, design teams will be forced to implement additional risk controls and protective measures for device designs that already have a low risk of harm for specific failure modes.

The requirement to implement additional risk controls will increase the cost of devices that may have been relatively safe without the risk controls. For example, if a device is not intended to be implanted, it is a potential foreseeable misuse. Your company may have used the instructions for use to communicate the residual risk associated with misuse of the device. However, now your company will have to implement design controls (e.g., –a selection of materials suitable for implantation) to eliminate the risks associated with misuse and protective measures (e.g., – radio-opaque thread) to help retrieve product that was implanted in an “off-label” usage.

If you are interested in risk management training, Medical Device Academy offers a risk management training webinar.

Risk Control Selection – Deviation #5 in ISO 14971 Read More »

Sep 4 2013

ALARP vs As far as possible – Deviation #3

3 Comments / ISO 14971:2019 (Risk Management) / By Robert Packard / ISO 14971, risk reduction

This third blog in a seven-part series reviews deviation #3, ALARP vs. “As far as possible,” with regard to risk reduction.

In 2012, the European National (EN) version of the Medical Device Risk Management Standard was revised, but there was no change to the content of Clauses 1 through 9. Instead, the European Commission identified seven content deviations between the 14971 Standard and the requirements of three device directives for Europe. This seven-part blog series reviews each of these changes individually and recommends changes to be made to your current risk management policies and procedure.

Note: This is 2013 blog that will be updated in the near future, but the following link is for our current risk management training.

Risk reduction: “As Far As Possible” (AFAP) vs. “As Low As Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP)

The third deviation is specific to the reduction of risk. Design solutions cannot always eliminate risk. This is why medical devices use protective measures (i.e., – alarms) and inform users of residual risks (i.e., – warnings and contraindications in an Instructions For Use (IFU). However, Essential Requirement 2 requires that risks be reduced “as far as possible.” Therefore, it is not acceptable to only reduce risks with cost-effective solutions. The “ALARP” concept has a legal interpretation, which implies financial considerations. However, the European Directives will not allow financial considerations to override the Essential Requirements for the safety and performance of medical devices. If risk controls are not implemented, the justification for this must be on another basis other than financial.

There are two acceptable reasons for not implementing certain risk controls. First, risk control will not reduce additional risk. For example, if your device already has one alarm to identify a battery failure, a second alarm for the same failure will not reduce further risk. The redundant alarms are often distracting, and too many alarms will result in users ignoring them.

The second acceptable reason for not implementing a risk control is that there is a more effective risk control that cannot be simultaneously implemented. For example, there are multiple ways to anchor orthopedic implants to bone. However, there is only enough real estate to have one fixation element at each location. If a femoral knee implant is already being anchored to the femur with metal posts and bone cement, you cannot also use bone screws at the same location on the femur to anchor the implants in place.

ALARP does not reduce risk “As far as possible”

Annex D.8 in ISO 14971, recommends the ALARP concept in Clause 3.4 of the 14971 Standard. Therefore, the risk management standard is contradicting the MDD. This contradiction is the primary reason why medical device companies should discontinue the use of phthalates and latex for most medical devices. Even though these materials are inexpensive solutions to many engineering challenges presented by medical devices, these materials present risks that can be avoided by using more expensive materials that are not hazardous and do not pose allergic reactions to a large percentage of the population. The use of safer materials is considered “state-of-the-art,” and these materials should be implemented if the residual risks, after implementation of the risk control (i.e., – use of a safer material) are not equal to, or greater than, the risk of the cheaper material.

Recommendation for eliminating ALARP

Your company may have created a risk management procedure that includes a matrix for severity and probability. The matrix is probably color-coded to identify red cells as unacceptable risks, yellow cells that are ALARP, and green cells that are acceptable. To comply with EN ISO 14971:2012, the “yellow zone” should not be labeled as ALARP. A short-term solution is to simply re-label these as high, medium, and low risks. Unfortunately, renaming the categories of risk high, medium, and low will not provide guidance as to whether the residual risk is reduced “as far as possible.”

Resolution to this deviation

As companies become aware of this deviation between the 14971 Standard and the Essential Requirements of the device directives, teams that are working on risk analysis, and people that are performing a gap analysis of their procedures will need to stop using a matrix, like the example above. Instead of claiming that the residual risks are ALARP, your company will need to demonstrate that risks are reduced AFAP, by showing objective evidence that all possible risk control options were considered and implemented. Your procedure or work instruction for performing a risk control option analysis may currently state that you will apply your risk management policy to determine if additional risk controls need to be applied, or if the residual risks are ALARP.

This procedure or work instruction needs to be revised to specify that all risk control options will be implemented unless the risk controls would not reduce risks further, or the risk controls are incompatible with other risk controls. Risk control options should never be ruled out due to cost.

ALARP vs As far as possible – Deviation #3 Read More »

Aug 27 2013

Risk Acceptability – Deviation #2 in EN ISO 14971

6 Comments / ISO 14971:2019 (Risk Management) / By Robert Packard / ISO 14971

This 7-part blog series continues with the author reviewing deviation #2, risk acceptability, in the EN ISO 14971:2012 Standard.

In 2012, the European National (EN) version of the Medical Device Risk Management Standard was revised, but there was no change to the content of Clauses 1 through 9. Instead, the European Commission identified seven content deviations between the 14971 Standard and the requirements of three device directives for Europe. This seven-part blog series reviews each of these changes individually. The second deviation is specific to risk acceptability.

Discretionary power of manufacturers as to Risk Acceptability

The second deviation is specific to determining risk acceptability in the risk evaluation process. The ISO 14971 Standard indicates in Annex D4 that the acceptability of risk is not specified by the Standard and must be determined by the manufacturer. Clause 3.2 of the 14971 Standard, it states that “Top management shall: define and document the policy for determining criteria for risk acceptability.” This risk management policy is intended to indicate a threshold for risk acceptability. In Clause 5 of the 14971 Standard, the manufacturer is instructed to evaluate whether risks are acceptable using the risk management criteria defined in the risk management policy.

Essential requirements 1 and 2 require that risks be reduced as far as possible and that all risks shall be included in a risk-benefit analysis—not just the risks that exceed a certain threshold for risk acceptability. Therefore, the requirement to establish a risk policy for the acceptability of risk directly contradicts the MDD.

Since the 2^nd edition of the 14971 Standard was first issued (i.e., -2007), clients have been asking me how to establish risk acceptability criteria, for new devices, I recommend benchmarking the risks of the new device against existing devices. In other words, if the new device presents equal or lower risks than existing devices, then the risks of the new device are acceptable. For existing devices, I recommend performing a risk-benefit analysis, evaluating adverse events observed with the device against the benefits of using the device. Unfortunately, most companies choose arbitrary thresholds for risk acceptability. Instead of relying upon benchmarking or risk-benefit analysis, companies will establish a policy that all risks must be below a quantitative value. For example, if the range of possible risk scores is from 1 to 1,000, all risks of 100 or less may be acceptable.

What is acceptable?

In order to comply with the EN ISO 14971:2012 version of the risk management standard, you will need to implement risk controls for all risks, regardless of acceptability. However, you will also need to perform a risk-benefit analysis. The risk-benefit analysis should consider not only the benefits to patients and the risks of using the device, but the analysis should also consider the relative benefits of using other devices.

The clinical evaluation report and the risk management report for the device should be based upon clinical evidence of the device for the intended use—including adverse events. For new devices that are evaluated based upon a literature review of equivalent devices, Notified Bodies expect a Post-Market Clinical Follow-up (PMCF) study to be conducted to verify that the actual risk-benefit of the device is consistent with the conclusions of the clinical evaluation. To perform this analysis, a clinical expert is necessary to properly evaluate the risk-benefit ratio of the device and to create a protocol for a PMCF study.

MEDDEV 2.12/2 rev 2, Post Market Clinical Follow-up Studies, indicates that the PMCF study protocol should indicate the study endpoints and the statistical considerations. In order to do this, your company will need to establish quantitative criteria for the acceptability of the identified risks. Therefore, the current 14971 Standard needs to be modified to clarify that risk acceptability criteria should be based upon clinical data, and evaluation of risks should be conducted at a later point in the risk management process (e.g., – as part of the overall risk-benefit analysis).

Impact of Deviation #2

As your company becomes aware of the second deviation between the 14971 Standard and the Essential Requirements of the device directives, your risk management team will need to change the risk management process to clarify when risk acceptability should be evaluated, and the risk management policy should specify how acceptability should be determined.

The risk management process at your company will need to specify that the implementation of risk controls is required for all risks—regardless of acceptability. You should also consider eliminating the evaluation of risk before the implementation of risk controls. Instead, your company should base the acceptability of risk solely upon the clinical risk-benefit analysis and should involve the manufacturer’s medical officer in making this determination.

Finally, your risk management process should specify the need for PMCF studies in order to verify that actual clinical data supports the conclusion that the risk-benefit ratio is acceptable over the lifetime of the device.

If you are interested in ISO 14971 training, we are conducting a risk management training webinar on October 19, 2018.

Risk Acceptability – Deviation #2 in EN ISO 14971 Read More »

Jun 11 2013

Benefits of Incorporating Risk Management into Procedure Documents

1 Comment / ISO 14971:2019 (Risk Management) / By Robert Packard / documentation, ISO 13485, Procedures, Risk Management

By Guest Blogger, Brigid Glass
The author discusses the benefits of incorporating risk management into procedure documents. An example procedure for Record Control is included.

I loved it when I was first introduced to FMEA many years ago. I loved the systematic approach and particularly appreciated using a Process FMEA to explain to those involved in a production process why specific controls had been implemented. I enthusiastically taught FMEA to our engineers. At the time, our bubbly, buoyant, outcomes-focused Training Manager said to me, “You Quality people have such a negative outlook. You’re always looking for what can go wrong!” Well, yes, but it’s our role to prevent things from going wrong! I’d found a tool to help me with that.

Next was EN 1441, a risk analysis standard that never satisfied and always felt incomplete. ISO 14971 followed, covering the entire lifecycle of a product with closed feedback loops. So now, product and process design risks are well covered, but ISO 13485 section 7.1 asks us to “establish documented requirements for risk management throughout product realization.” Many of us would acknowledge that we could do better despite passing audits. And what about the rest of the quality management system? I know that when we document a procedure, we already apply risk management principles in our heads, but we usually don’t apply them systematically or write down the results.

The Idea

Recently, Rob Packard and I started work on a project requiring us to generate a complete set of documentation for a QMS compliant with U.S. and EU requirements, including ISO 13485 and ISO 14971. We each had our ideas on how best to write a procedure, but this project allowed us to get some synergy going. Rob wanted to address risk management in each procedure. “Yes!” I said, thinking that there was a chance to fill that gap. But then, it was my job to develop the template for the procedures and work out how to accomplish this.

My first results looked very complicated, so I took the KISS (Keep It Simple, Sweetheart) approach: one column for the hazards and consequences and one for the risk control measures.

What I didn’t include:

I started with more complex hazard documentation (hazard ID, impact, trigger event, etc.). Still, I felt the benefits in the context of a procedure document was not balanced by the extra complexity and work required for analysis and training. It would be a hard sell to users within an organization who were not used to the risk management approach.
I decided not to assess risks and controls quantitatively for the same reasons as in the bullet point above.
Initially, I included references to implementation, but this would be difficult to maintain as other documents changed.
I thought about verification of the implementation of risk controls, then decided to leave that verification to reviewers.

Below is an example from a procedure for Record Control in which records are completed on paper and then scanned as a PDF. My list won’t be the same as yours, but it is illustrative.

Standards and regulations are essentially a set of risk controls, so they are the first starting point when identifying hazards. The list should include direct risks to products, risks to the integrity of the QMS, and regulatory risks. For those of us who have been in this industry for a while, experience, past mistakes, questions fielded in external audits, and observations of other systems will yield further hazards and appropriate controls. Audits allow updating and refining the list and testing the control measures.

Benefits of Incorporating Risk Management into Procedure Documents

Impresses your ISO 13485 auditor!
When first writing procedure documents, starting the writing process by reviewing the external requirements and systematically writing the risk section sharpens the mind as to what must be included in the procedure. This is the same approach as in design controls, where we include risk mitigators that apply to product design in the design inputs. This is part of planning in the PDCA cycle.

Supports future decision-making, in the same way, that the risk file for a product is considered when a design is changed. The risk control section of a procedure provides the criteria against which any improvement or change can be assessed. Will it enhance the risk controls, or might it introduce a new hazard?
Serves as the basis for training on the procedure. Making visible the link between potential hazards and procedural controls much more convincing than saying, “Do this because the procedure says so,” or, “It’s in the procedure because the regs say so.”

This is part 1 in a series of blogs that leads up to our Roadmap to Iso 13485 Certification Courses

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